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Occupational Licensing:
Factoring It Out

JAMES A. CATHCART*
GIL GRAFF**

Occupational licensing, the zenith of state regulation, is rooted in the
notion that stringent entry requirements and ongoing scrutiny by government will assure the protection of the consumer public. Such protection is
deemed necessary because of the difficulty consumers have in ascertaining
the competence of those who hold themselves out as skilled, and because of
consumers' inability to recognize when or if substantial injury has been
sustained at the hands of the provider.
The standards under which occupations are licensed emphasize educational preparation, an examination, and, in many instances, lengthy experience requirements.' It is commonly assumed that the combination of
academic education and practical training is essential to the development of
a qualified professional. The examination is generally utilized not as a
substitute for such training but to validate a minimum standard of knowledge that should have been learned and retained during such training.
Of the aforementioned standards, experience requirements for licensure
warrant particularly close scrutiny. The issue of experience requirements is
of dual importance. First, such requirements may serve to restrict qualified
Consultant to the California Senate Committee on Business and Professions.
California Senate Fellow, 1976-77. J.D., UCLA, Member, California State Bar.
1. See generally, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, STATE LICENSING
HEALTH OCCUPATIONS 11-16 (1967); COMM'N ON CAL. STATE Gov'T ORGANIZATION AND
*
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OF

ECONOMONY,

11-13 (1967).

AN EXAMINATION OF THE DEP'T OF PROFESSIONAL AND VOCATIONAL STANDARDS
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persons from pursuing the vocation of their choice, "a distinguishing
feature of our republican institutions.'"2 Concomitantly, experience requirements may, by serving as barriers to entry, curb competition and result in
higher prices for the consumer. Given these possible deleterious effects,
statutes requiring prior experience for licensure should, indeed, meet standards for reasonableness and not be arbitrary and lacking in rational basis.
Given the nature and circumstances surrounding their enactment, however, such statutes may be lacking this requisite rationality. The growth of
occupational licensing throughout the country has been described as "a
haphazard, uncoordinated, and chaotic process." 4 The various "Practice
Acts" in California, 5 as elsewhere, were individually enacted (generally at
the behest of the new group to be licensed) over a period of many decades
and, as a consequence, the licensing system that emerged shows little
consistency.
It is no secret that the licensing system that has emerged has generally
established standards, including experience requirements, that have the
effect of reducing competition and establishing barriers designed to restrict
entry to an occupation. 6 This has been the result largely because occupational licensing has occurred at the behest of the occupational group to be
8
licensed. 7 The group, itself, commonly drafts the legislative proposals
enacted into law, and as such, has written legislative proposals designed to
benefit the occupation economically. 9 Thus, the whole thrust of occupational licensing has been "toward decreasing competition by restricting
access to the occupation; toward a definition of occupational prerogatives
that will debar others from sharing in them . ... 10
The present array of experience requirements among the licensed occupations in California is utterly chaotic and lacks an overriding rationale,
mirroring the inconsistency of the licensing system itself. For example, a
dispensing optician, who fits and sells eyeglasses only upon prescription of
another licensed person, must possess five years of experience prior to
2. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1889).
3. STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REGULATION OF THE TELEVISION
REPAIR INDUSTRY IN LOUISIANA AND CALIFORNIA: A CASE STUDY 17 (1974); Barron, Business
and ProfessionalLicensing-California,a RepresentativeExample, 18 STAN. L. REV. 640, 643

(1966).

4. B. SHIMBERG, B. ESSER & D. KRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND
POLICIES i (1973).
5. A "Practice Act" contains the statutes pertaining to the licensing of an individual
occupation; such as, the "Medical Practice Act" contains those statutes pertaining to the
licensing and regulation of physicians and surgeons.
6. W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 114 (1956).
7. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND PUBLIC POLICY, FINAL REPORT
TO MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION 7-8 (1972).
8. Id. at 11.
9. A classic example of this tendency may be seen in SB 236, 1977-78 Regular Session of
the California Legislature.
10. W. GELLHORN,. INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 114 (1956).
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licensure. 11 A hearing aid dispenser, on the other hand, who diagnoses
hearing disorders and fits and sells hearing aids to any person he or she
pleases, need not possess any experience whatsoever. 12 Clearly, when such
irrationality occurs within occupational licensing laws, it is time to examine
their validity.
This article will examine the validity of experience requirements in
California's occupational licensing statutes by performing four primary
tasks. First, the article will examine the legal basis for challenging California statutes or regulations establishing experience requirements as a condition of licensure. Second, the article will establish a model that may be used
to perform a comparative analysis of existing occupational experience requirements. Third, the article will survey the experience requirements of 58
occupations 13 licensed by 28 licensing entities 4 located within the Department of Consumer Affairs 15 and perform a comparative analysis to determine the rationality of such requirements. Last, the article will suggest some
alternative actions the California Legislature may take to establish a system
in which experience requirements for occupational licensure are rational,
fair, and a proper exercise of the state's police power.
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AS A LEGAL BASIS FOR CHALLENGING LICENSING
STATUTES

As regulations enacted for the health, safety and welfare of the public,
licensing restrictions have generally been found to be a valid exercise of the
state's police power. 16 The fact that the legislature enacts occupational
licensing statutes under its police power, however, does not completely
shield these statutes from judicial review. Courts in the past have held that
11.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2552.
12. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §3327.
13. See Tables A & B infra.
14. The licensing entities surveyed are the Board of Osteopathic Examiners, Board of
Medical Quality Assurance, Board of Behavioral Science Examiners, Board of Chiropractic
Examiners, Board of Dental Examiners, Board of Nursing Home Administrators, Board of
Pharmacy, Board of Registered Nursing, Board of Examiners in Veterinary Medicine, Board of
Optometry, Board of Vocational Nurse and Psychiatric Technician Examiners, Board of Guide
Dogs for the Blind, Board of Registration for Professional Engineers, Board of Architectural
Examiners, Contractors State License Board, Structural Pest Control Board, Board of Accountancy, Cemetery Board, Board of Registered Construction Inspectors, Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, Board of Geologists and Geophysicists, Board of Landscape Architects,
Board of Fabric Care, Board of Barber Examiners, Board of Cosmetology, Certified Shorthand
Reporters Board, Bureau of Employment Agencies, and the Bureau of Collection and Investigative Services.
15. Approximately 50 additional occupations are licensed by some ten separate licensing
entities falling outside of the jurisdiction of the Department of Consumer Affairs.
16. See, e.g., Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910); California Reduction Co. v.
Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
There are still isolated decisions, however, that hold that the police power does not extend far
enough to regulate the occupation in question. Note, Due ProcessLimitationson Occupational
Licensing, 59 VA. L. REv. 1097, 1099 n. 14 (1973). For some reason, photographers are often the
object of such decisions. See, e.g., Sullivan v. DeCerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So. 2d 571 (1945); State
v. Gleason, 128 Mont. 485, 277 P.2d 530 (1954); State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731
(1949). Similar holdings can be found with regard to watchmakers. See State ex rel. Whetsel v.
Wood, 207 Okla. 193, 248 P.2d 612 (1952).
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the scope and method of occupational licensing statutes are reviewable
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 17 In order for the
due process clause to limit the state's licensing power, however, freedom of
occupational choice must be shown to be a "liberty" or "property" interest. For many years a line of authority, best illustrated by the 1954 United
States Supreme Court decision in Barsky v. Board of Regents,18 held that
the practice of a particular occupation was a privilege, not a right, and hence
unprotected by the fourteenth amendment. 19 A more recent line of cases,
however, rejects the right-privilege distinction and brings freedom of occupational choice under the protection of the fourteenth amendment.2 0 In the
1957 case of Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,21 the Court was explicit
about the applicability of the fourteenth amendment:
A state cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or
from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22
The Court went on to state:
We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is
a 'right' or 'privilege.' Regardless of how the State's grant of
permission to engage in this occupation is characterized, it is
sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing
except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is not a
matter of the State's grace. 23
The Court's clear statement has been reiterated since Schware and has
virtually laid to rest the right-privilege distinction as applied to occupational
choice.24
Freedom of occupational choice may also be protectable as a "liberty"
interest? 5 In the 1972 case of Board of Regents v. Roth,26 the Court stated,
"[i]n a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed.''27 Quoting from Meyer v.
Nebraska,28 the majority included freedom "to engage in any of the com17. See, e.g. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Doyle v. Board of Barber Examiners, 219 Cal. App. 2d 504, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 349 (1963); Whitcomb, v. Emerson, 46 Cal. App. 2d 263, 115 P.2d 892 (1941); Note Due
Process Limitations on OccupationalLicensing. 59 VA. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1973).
18. 347 U.S. 422 (1954).
19. Id. at 451.
20. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Cramp v. Board of Pub.

Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1960); Greene v. McElroy, 369 U.S. 474 (1959); Speiser v. Randall,

357 U.S. 513 (1958); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
21. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
22. Id. at 238-39.
23. Id. at 239 n.5.
24. See note 20 supra.
25. Note, Due Process Limitations on OccupationalLicensing, 59 VA. L. REV. 1097,
1102-03 (1973).
26. '408 U.S. 564 (1972).
27. Id. at 572.
28. 626 U.S. 390 (1923).
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mon occupations of life" 29 within the definition of liberty. Thus, it seems
clear that federal courts would use the fourteenth amendment as a standard
in determining the validity of requirements in occupational licensing statutes.
As a practical matter, however, federal courts have been reluctant to
review occupational licensing statutes. The 1955 case of Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc. is illustrative. 30 In upholding a state statute that prohibited
opticians from duplicating lenses without a prescription from an optometrist
or an ophthalmologist, the Supreme Court declared that:
The. . . law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many
cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the
advantages and disadvantages of the requirement. . . . [T]he law
need not bein every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it.
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory
of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
31
thought.
Nonetheless, this declaration by the Supreme Court has not prevented the
federal courts from reviewing occupational licensing statutes on due process
grounds. 32 Further, it is clear that state courts are free to examine the
validity of state occupational licensing statutes. 33 State courts, in fact, have
34
invalidated state occupational licensing statutes on due process grounds.
Along these lines, California courts have indicated their willingness to
review occupational licensing statutes on due process grounds. In Whitcomb
v. Emerson,35 a California Appellate Court ruled that the Cosmetology Act
29. 408 U.S. at 572.
30. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
31. Id. at 487-88.
32. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1966), appeal

dismissed, 389 U.S. 46, rehearingdenied, 389 U.S. 999 (1967).

33. Fulda, Controls of Entry into Business and Professions-A ComparativeAnalysis, 8
TEX. INT'L L.J. 109, 119 (1973); Note, Due ProcessLimitations on OccupationalLicensing, 59
VA. L. REV. 1097, 1116 (1973). In 1949, Professor Paul Freund noted:

The Supreme Court's recent reluctance to declare state laws unconstitutional under
the due-process clause unless basic civil liberities are involved has important implica-

tions for litigation. The result may well be that constitutional litigation over state laws
will be concentrated more and more in state courts under state constitutional provisions, and state constitutional law may become of dominant importance.
P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 115-16 (1949). Another commentator
notes that "state courts are free to develop their own doctrines of state constitutional law
independent of [the Supreme Court's] decisions, as long as in doing so they do not contravene
federal law." Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Prqcessof Law,
53 Nw. U.L.- REV. 226, 250 (1959).
34. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Emerson, 46 Cal. App. 2d 263, 115 P.2d 892 (1941); People v.
Brown, 407 11. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1950).
35. 46 Cal. App. 2d 263, 115 P.2d 892 (1941).
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was unconstitutional insofar as it purported to require a face masseuse to
possess experience in and pass an examination in other unrelated branches
of cosmetology. The court declared:
[W]hile the several occupations specified in the act are proper
subjects of legislative regulation, the relation of those having no
reasonable natural association . . . amount to the taking of...
property without due process of law .... 36
Again in Doyle v. Board of Barber Examiners,37 a California Appellate
Court specifically stated that:
[T]he right to engage in a legitimate employment or business
receives recognitition as a portion of the individual freedoms
secured by the
due process provision of the federal and state
38
Constitutions .
In this same opinion, however, the court also indicated that great deference
would be given to legislative determinations in the licensing area by stating
that:
[J]udicial examination of a statute under economic due process
attack is completed when any fact or facts appear which the
have accepted as the basis for a findLegislature might rationally
39
ing of public interest.
Such judicial deference was adhered to by the California Supreme Court
in the 1967 case of Eye Dog Foundationv. State Board of Guide Dogs for
the Blind.40 In this case, the court denied the plaintiff's contention that the
statutory provisions of regulating guide dogs for the blind are "unreasonable
and arbitrary and violative of due process . ...41 In Doyle v. Board of
BarberExaminers,42the court stated, "[W]e may invalidate the statute only
if these theories are devoid of any rational connection with the public
43
interest objectives as the Legislature may have conceived them."
While the number of cases that have been reviewed on due process
grounds in federal and California courts in the occupational licensing area is
small, nonetheless, it seems clear that both the federal courts and California
courts will use the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as a
standard by which occupational licensing statutes are to be judged.
It is therefore important to discuss the limitations that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment places on these statutes. Essentially,
there would seem to be three requirements that the due process clause places
36. Id. at 277, 115 P.2d at 900.
37.. 219 Cal. App. 2d 504, 33 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1963).
38. Id. at 509, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 353.

39. Id. at 514, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 356.

40. 67 Cal. 2d 536, 432 P.2d 717, 63 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1967).
41. Id. at 542, 432 P.2d at 722, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
42. 219 Cal. App. 2d 504, 33 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1963).
43. Id. at 519, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58.
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on occupational licensing schemes.' The licensing schemes must be drawn
up with specificity,4 5 rationality '6 and fairness.4 7 Specificity means that the
standards and guidelines that a licensing board uses in granting, denying,
suspending, renewing or revoking a license be intelligible.4 8 Rationality
means that the standards bear a reasonable relation to effective practice of
the regulated occupation. 49 Fairness pertains to the make-up of the licensing
board, the procedures it follows, and the necessity and timing of judicial
50
review.
This article is primarily concerned with the rationality of occupational
licensing schemes in California. Before one can tell whether a court would
invalidate the California scheme on due process grounds, one must first
examine the rationality of the current California scheme. Thus California's
licensing scheme will be examined by comparing one occupation to another
to determine the rationality of the scheme as a whole.
ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA'S CURRENT LICENSING SCHEME

In order to determine the rationality of California's current occupational
licensing scheme, the authors surveyed 58 occupations currently licensed by
the California Department of Consumer Affairs, all of which require passage of a board approved examination for licensure eligiblity. It was found
that 29 of these occupations require no experience as a prerequisite to
licensure and 29 require some experience. Of the 29 occupations requiring
some experience for licensure, the length of required experience ranges
from six months to five years beyond any educational requirements. An
examination of the current experience requirements suggested three conclusions:
1. There is no apparent "rational basis" for the distinction between
occupations in which experience is necessary and occupations for which
44. Note, Due Process Limitations on OccupationalLicensing, 59 VA. L. REv. 1097, 1103

(1973).
45. Id. at 1104 n.36. The due process clauses of the fifth amendment (when a federal
statute is involved) and the fourteenth amendment (when a state statute is involved) require that
a criminal statute be declared void when it is so vague that "men of common intelligence must

necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application ....

" Conally v. General

Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Undue vagueness in the statute will result in its being
held unconstitutional whether the uncertainty goes to the persons within the scope of the
statute, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); the conduct which is forbidden, Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948);

or the punishment which may be imposed, United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948). See
generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67

(1960).
46. The Supreme Court has long recognized its power to review legislation regulating
economic affairs to determine if the means selected "have a real and substantial relation to the

object sought to be attained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). Note, Due

ProcessLimitations on OccupationalLicensing, 59 VA. L. REV. 1097, 1111, n.68 (1973).
47. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Note, Due ProcessLimitationson Occupational
Licensing, 58 VA. L. REV. 1097, 1118 (1973).

48. Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REV. 1097,

1103-04 (1973).
49. Id. at 1104.
50. Id.
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experience is not necessary. For example, there appears to be no "rational
basis" as to why prospective barbers52need apprentice for 15 months, 5 1 and
prospective cosmetologists need not.
2. There is -no apparent "rational basis" upon which the determination
of an "appropriate" length of required experience is made for those occupations in which experience is required for licensure. For example, an educational psychologist need possess three years experience for licensure 53 while
a psychologist, whose practice is more discretionary, need possess only two
54
years experience.
3. The imposition of experience requirements for licensure in any of the
occupations might be unwarranted given the fact that completion of an
approved standard of academic training and the passage of rigorous boardadministered examinations often measures the very same practical skills that
applicants are required to demonstrate through years of documented experience prior to becoming eligible for licensure 55 (and, indeed, 50 percent of
the occupations surveyed do not impose any experience requirements what56
soever).
While the necessity of an experience requirement for any occupation
raises an important policy concern, the authors do not address this issue in
the present article. It is assumed for purposes of this analysis that a wellreasoned approach to the issue of experience requirements for occupational
licensing might conclude that experience is, in fact, an essential aspect of
preparation for the practice of certain occupations.
Whether or not experience becomes a prerequisite for licensure appears to
be more a function of particular political events surrounding the passage of
the licensing program rather than any deliberate, rational legislative policy.
Thus, as has already been pointed out, experience requirements, as most
other licensing law requirements, were developed in a haphazard and uncoordinated manner.5 7 In recent years, the California Legislature has recognized that certain aspects of practice acts were developed in a haphazard
manner and have sought to correct many provisions common to practice acts
that might be subject to court challenge under due process limitations
58
established by court decisions. For example, citizenship requirements,
51.
52.
53.
54.

CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.

BUS.
Bus.
BUS.
BUS.

& PROF.
& PROF.
& PROF.
& PROF.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

§6545(d).
§7332.
§17862(e).
§2914(d),

55. In 1969, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants adopted a statement
of institute policy that stated that all experience requirements mandated by State Accountancy
Practice Acts be eliminated by 1975. The basis of this statement was the recommendation made
in AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON
EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CPAs 6 (1969). This report elaborated a series
of reasons why an experience requirement was not a viable method of determining qualifica.
tions for licensure. Id. at 12.
56. See Tables A & B infra.
57. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
58. AB 1986, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1285, at 2556.
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good moral character and similar requirements,5 9 and age requirements
above the age of majority, 6° have all been eliminated by legislative action.
In all three instances, arguments were made before the legislative committees that such requirements were probably unconstitutional in that due
process of individuals seeking licensure was violated.61 Specifically, it was
argued that the aforementioned requirements bore no reasonable relationship
to the licensed activity and hence served as an unreasonable interference
62
with a person's right to pursue the occupation of his or her choice.
Legislation has also recently been enacted to eliminate any additional
requirements that may be placed upon applicants for licensure in the event
that such applicants failed a license examination. 63 In this instance, it was
successfully argued before legislative committees that there existed no
rational basis for requiring an applicant to wait a period of time or to obtain
additional education or experience in order to be eligible for relicensure (and
as such could be subject to court attack under due process). 64
The elimination of age, citizenship, time and moral qualifications as a
prerequisite to licensure are, hopefully, only the first steps in what will be an
ongoing trend towards rationalizing the now chaotic scheme of occupational
licensing. The legislature needs to act to further rationalize existing licensing laws not only because of its moral, obligation to establish reasonable and
fair licensing standards, but because its previous actions may be subject to
attack under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6 5
Even though experience requirements may be challengeable under the due
process or equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as not being
enacted on a rational basis, such a challenge is problematic at best. Nonetheless, the constitutional issues surrounding occupational licensing requirements remain and must be considered by both the courts and the legislature
to ensure that legislatively enacted requirements are not an unreasonable
interference with a person's right to engage in the occupation of his or her
choice.
This article proposes that the legislature develop a means of rationalizing
the critical issues of occupational licensing before an attack on due process
grounds is made. In analyzing California's current occupational licensing
scheme, the apparently random imposition of experience requirements is of
fundamental concern. It is the authors' hope that the analytical framework
59. SB 1767, CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1321, at 2874.
60. AB 686, CAL. STATS. 1972, c.579, §§1-8, at 989.
61. Personal observations by James Cathcart who was present at legislative hearings
where oral arguments were presented by proponents of the legislation, in Sacramento, Calif.
(July 13, 1972, Feb. 8, 1972, and July 20, 1972, respectively).
62. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
63. SB 1675, CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 743, §2, at 1642.
64. Argument presented by James Cathcart before the California Senate Committee on

Business and Professions, in Sacramento, Calif. (June 12, 1974).
65. See text accompanying notes 16-43 supra.
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proposed herein will assist legislators and other policymakers in approaching the area of experience requirements by providing a rational structure
within which to examine this important issue.
THE MODEL

The first step in analyzing the relative need for prior experience as a
requirement for licensure among the various occupations is to isolate those
factors that might warrant a modicum of experience as a prerequisite to
licensure. The experience requirement of each licensed occupation surveyed
was evaluated and rated in terms of three factors: seriousness of impact upon
the consumer, discretion of the occupational licensee, and practical training
received in educational prerequisites by the applicant for licensure. The
definition of each of these factors and the evaluation of each factor will be
discussed in the following sections.
1. Seriousness of Impact
Seriousness of impact reflects the very foundation upon which occupational 'licensing rests: the protection of the health and welfare of the public.
Factors which would indicate seriousness of impact are: (a) potential degree
of bodily, emotional, fiscal, or visual and environmental harm; (b) probability of harm; (c) lasting or continuing nature of effect; (d) degree to which
effect may be remedied; (e) discoverability of error. This factor is assessed
as it relates to the general consumer public, that is, those who are not in a
special position to ascertain professional competence. Thus, generally,
consideration of seriousness of impact was limited to its effect on an
individual, and not its effect on a large business or governmental entity. For
example, a landscape architect may design faulty irrigation designs for both
a homeowner and school district. The seriousness of impact is considered on
the basis of impact to the homeowner and not to the school district. When
these criteria are utilized, it is readily observable, for example, that a
physician would have very serious impact on the public as compared to say a
barber. A barber's malfeasance, contrary to a physician's, is generally
discoverable, remediable, not of lasting effect, and has a low probability of
harmful action of a serious nature. Thus, a physician may be expected to
score higher with respect to the seriousness of his or her malfeasance while a
66
barber may be expected to score lower.
2. Discretion
The need for the licensee to develop the ability to intelligently exercise
discretion is a factor frequently invoked to justify the requirement of a
66. See Tables A & B infra.
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prolonged period of experience. To the extent that an occupation calls for a
significant degree of independent judgment, some "field experience" might
well be warranted. Factors that might indicate the amount of discretion that
is called for in a particular occupation are: (a) degree of independence in
selection and application of treatment modalities; (b) degree of complexity
of treatment modalities; (c) expansiveness of scope of practice; (d) degree to
which a person works under another licensed individual (exclusive of
experience requirement); (e) whether employing institution is qualified to
judge qualifications of employees. Utilizing the aforementioned criteria, it
is clear that a veterinarian has a significantly larger amount of and higher
quality of discretion in the performance of his or her duties than say a
dispensing optician or a pharmacist. The latter occupations are precise and
exacting. The practitioners, however, have little independence and must
conform their duties to those prescribed by optometrists and physicians,
respectively.
3.

Lack of PracticalTraining

While practical training is widely recognized as an important element in
developing occupational skills, there are often extensive programs of practical training included within the educational background required for licensure in the various occupations. In such cases, an additional experience
requirement may be superfluous and devoid of any "rational connection"
with fitness to engage in the particular occupation. Educational programs for
various occupations thus need to be evaluated in terms of: (a) degree to
which practical, clinical (or "hands on") training is absent from educational
requirements; (b) degree to which education is not directly related to
licensed function. Occupations such as vocational nursing and cosmetology
would score low in this factor in that both occupations' training requirements are geared almost exclusively for the preparation of their occupation.
In the case of cosmetology, the actual practice of shampooing, cutting,
giving facials, and manicures on consumers constitutes the bulk of their
school requirements. In contrast, many occupations, such as contractors,
dispensing opticians, and security guards, have no formal educational requirements at all (that is, beyond high school graduation or its equivalent),
and thus would score high.
In an effort to determine the rationality of California's current occupational licensing scheme, the authors evaluated each of the 58 occupations in
terms of the three factors that were previously discussed. Numerical values
were assigned to each of the three factors to indicate whether the occupation
being evaluated required a substantial amount (3), moderate amount (2),
slight amount (1), or none of the factors in question.
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Since the ultimate rationale for occupational licensing is the protection of
the public, Factor 1 (seriousness of impact) is of greater significance than
Factors 2 and 3 (discretion and lack of practical training). Therefore, in
computing the total numerical value for an occupation, a multiplier of 1.5
was applied to Factor 1, to accord it greater weight.
The highest numerical score that an occupation might reach is 10.5. At
this level an occupation would (1) have a serious impact on consumers, (2)
involve the exercise of considerable discretion, and (3) require almost no
practical training, within the educational qualifications for licensure. Thus,
if experience requirements are a valid and rational means to determine
competency, some amount of required experience might be justified for
those occupations scoring at the high end of the rating continuum. While
assignment of scores to the various occupations on this basis may be
somewhat discretionary (hinging upon the rater's analysis of the factors as
applied to the particular occupations), 67 application of this model at least
evaluates experience requirements in. terms of a uniform set of criteria and
allows for a rational determination of the appropriateness of such requirements.
ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA'S CURRENT LICENSING SCHEME IN
TERMS OF THE MODEL

For purposes of analysis, the 58 occupations surveyed were divided into
two groupings: health occupations (consisting of 30 occupations) and
nonhealth occupations (consisting of 28 occupations). Each of the occupations was evaluated in terms of the model that was set forth in the previous
section. The data demonstrate that among occupations with substantially
similar impact, discretion and practical training profiles (such as veterinarians, dispensing opticians, geophysicists, and funeral directors) there are
widely differing experience requirements (such as from no experience required to seven years required). Further, certain occupations with very low
factor ratings (such as barbers and embalmers) have considerable experience
requirements. Thus, based on this model, it appears that the present scheme
of experience requirements among the licensed occupations surveyed is
sorely lacking an overriding rationale. Additionally, the general scheme
illumines the utterly random spread of experience requirements among the
licensed occupations. By examining the data, it is possible not only to
develop some perspective as to the existing chaos in the area of experience
requirements, but also to draw some conclusions as to the determination of
rational distinctions between the various occupations in terms of the relative
need for experience as a prerequisite for licensure.
67. The rating was performed by the authors of this article. The rating is based only on
personal knowledge of the occupations and as such has not been validated.
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TABLE A
HEALTH PROFESSIONS (Care/Treatment)

Profession

Total
Points

Experience Requirement (beyond
education requirements)

Impact
(1.5
Multiplier)

cretion

Dis-

Lack of
Practical
Training

Osteopaths

8.5

I year

(3) 4.5

3

Physicians

8.5

I year

(3)

4.5

3

Marriage, Family &
Child Counselors
Psychologists

8
8

2 years
2 years professional
experience, at
least1 year
after obtaining Ph.D.

(2)
(2)

3
3

3
3

2
2

Clinical Social Workers

7

2 years

(2)

3

Educational
Psychologists

7

(2)

3

2
2

2
2

Chiropractors

6

3 years full-time
experience as credentialed school
psychologist. I
year's credit
for approved
internship
0

(2)

3

Dentists

6

0

(2)

3

Nursing Home
Administrators

6

0

(2)

3
I

2

I

3
3

Pharmacists

6

1500 hours practical

(2) 3

experience

Podiatrists '
Registered Nurses
Registered Social
Workers
Speech Pathologists
& Audiologists
Hearing Aid Dispensers
Registered Dispensing
Opticians
Veterinarians
Optometrists
Acupuncturists
Psychology Assistants
Physical Therapists
Physician's Assistants
Psychiatric Technicians
Registered Dental
Assistants
Registered Dental
Hygienists
Trainer, Guide Dogs
for the Blind
Licensed Vocational
Nurses
Nurses-Midwives
Animal Health
Technicians
Physical Therapy
Assistants

6

0

6

0

6

0

6

9 months full-time,
or 18 months
part-time
5 years

(2) 3
(1) 1.5
(1) 1.5
(1) .5
(2) 3
(i)

2.5

0 (if training received in
school)

1.5

(1)

1.5

(2)
(1)
(1)
(i)

3

(i)

1.5

1.5

1.5
1.5

(1) 1.5

(1) 1.5

0

0
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TABLE B
NONHEALTH PROFESSIONS

Profession
Engineers

Total
Points

Experience Requirement (beyond
education
requirements)

Impact
(1.5
Multiplier)

Discretion

Lack of
Practical
Training

10.5

6 years (4 year col-

(3) 4.5

3

3

(3) 4.5

3

2

lege degree counts
as 4 years)

Architects

9.5

8 years (5 year
approved architect
degree satisfies
5 years)

Contractors
Employment Agencies
Private Investigators
Pest Control Operators

8

4 years

8

1 year

8

2 years

6.5

2-4 years (depending on branches)

Accountants

6

2-4 years (depending on educational
background)

Cemetery Brokers
Cemetery Salesmen
Collection Agency
Operators
Construction
Inspectors
Field Representatives
(Pest Control)
Funeral Directors
Geologists

5.5

2 years

I year
4-5 years
5.5

6 months

5.5

5.5

Geophysicists

5.5

Insurance Adjusters
Landscape Architects

5.5
5.5

Nurses Registries

5.5

0

7 years (B.S. in the
field counts as 2 yrs.
Up to 2 years for
graduate work)
7 years (B.S. in the
field counts as 2 yrs.
Up to 2 years for
graduate work)
2 years
6 years (4 year degree from boardapproved program

(I)

1.5

(1) 1.5
(I) 1.5

= 4 years)

Private Patrol
Operators
Repossessors
Fabric Care
Embalmers
Barbers
Cosmetologists
Electrologists
Certified Shorthand
Reporters
Cosmeticians
Manicurists

5.5

2 years (experience
in personnel)
1 year

(I)

1.5

1

(1) 1.5

1 year
0
2 years (disposition
of 100 human bodies)
12-15 months
0
0
0
0
0

(I)
(I)
(1)
(I)

1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5

1
I
I
0

0
0
0
0

(I) 1.5
(1) 1.5

0
0

0
0
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Table A, Health Occupations, lists 30 health occupations and their experience requirements, and charts their factor ratings. The occupations are listed
in descending order on total number of points. Occupations having an
identical total number of points are listed in random order. As Table A
indicates, the point-range among the nine health occupations requiring
experience is 5.5 to 8.5. Among the 21 health occupations not requiring
experience, the point range is 2.5 to 6.0; eight of these occupations rate 5.5
to 6.0, which is identical to the rating of the health occupations that do
require experience. Thus, if dentists, registered nurses, veterinarians,
chiropractors, hearing aid dispensers, nursing home administrators, podiatrists, and registered social workers (all 5.5 to 6.0) need no experience for
licensure, it would seem that pharmacists, speech pathologists, audiologists,
and dispensing opticians (5.5 to 6.0) should be similarly treated.
Table B, Nonhealth Occupations, lists 28 occupations, 20 of which
require experience as a prerequisite to licensure. Here, the point range
among occupations requiring experience is 2.5 to 10.5 (only five of the 20
nonhealth occupations requiring experience rate above seven). Table B
indicates that construction inspectors, funeral directors, insurance adjusters,
pest control field representatives and geologists all rated 5.5 using the factor
approach, indicating that all should have similar experience requirements.
In reality, however, the required experience for these fields ranges from
zero to seven years. No conceivable rationale can account for this random
table of requirements.
SUGGESTED APPROACH TO RATIONALIZING THE EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS

Table B, with 20 nonhealth occupations requiring experience shows only
five occupations in the range 8.0 to 10.5. There is a clear gap between these
five and the other 15 nonhealth occupations requiring experience, as
evidenced by the fact that the 15 others range from 2.5 to 6.5. Table A
shows nine health occupations requiring some form of experience. Of the
nirie, six have factors of over 7, two have factors of 6, and one has a factor
of 5.5.
Thus, there are 11 (of 58) health and nonhealth currently licensed occupations surveyed which can, perhaps, be distinguished as to the necessity for
an experience requirement (such as those that possess factors of seven or
more). Two of these 11 occupations, physicians and osteopaths, have an
impact and discretion that may be so great as to warrant an experience
requirement despite extensive practical training. Each of the remaining of
these 11 occupations involves at least moderate impact and discretion and
lacks some practical training (a 3, 2, 2 profile) so that an experience
requirement would appear to be reasonable. Those occupations meeting this
standard are: psychologists; marriage, family and child counselors; educa-
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tional psychologists; clinical social workers; engineers; architects; contractors; employment agency operators; and private investigators. Among the
18 occupations currently requiring experience, which such a standard would
eliminate from the list, are barbers (2.5) and embalmers (3.5). Additionally,
a case could be made for a substantial reduction of experience requirements
for a host of occupations including accountants, geologists, dispensing
opticians, landscape architects, etc.
Once it has been established that some sort of experience will be required
for an occupation, a scale of length of experience requirements reflecting the
point spread from base (7) to apex (10.5) should be devised. Logically, an
occupation scoring seven should have a relatively short experience requirement, while an occupation scoring 10.5 should have a more lengthy experience requirement. A continuum of experience (perhaps nine months to two
years), paralleling the range of total points would rationalize a now chaotic
situation that finds contractors (8) requiring four years for licensure, employment agency owners (8) requiring one year for licensure, and educational psychologists (7) requiring three years for licensure.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the lack of rationality in the current scheme, the legislature should
act to establish a mechanism to rationally review existing statutes to determine the kind and extent of experience, if any, that may be necessary and
proper for the health and safety of the public. Whereas it may be difficult for
the legislature in any given instance to act rationally with regard to experience requirements, the legislature could establish a mechanism to determine
whether individual experience requirements were a valid and reasonable
basis by which to assess an individual's competence to practice an occupation. The legislature, for example, could establish a licensing commission,
one of whose duties would be to recommend to the legislature the appropriate level, if any, of experience required for licensure for existing occupational practice acts and new occupational practice acts through the utilization of a model similar to the model proposed in this article.
An alternative mechanism the legislature might utilize is to establish
statutory language mandating that it examine any new or existing experience
requirements according to a set of statutory guidelines similar to those
suggested in the model developed for this article.
CONCLUSIONS

This article has examined 58 licensed occupations with respect to any
experience standard that must be met by an applicant prior to becoming
eligible for licensure. It has been found, generally, that whether or not an
experience standard is required, and to what length, if required, has not been
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rationally determined by the legislature. Such requirements in many, if not
most instances, appear random and without any rational basis.
Any particular experience requirement could be subject to judicial review
if such requirement could be proved to the satisfaction of the court that it
was without any rational basis. While it is unlikely that court review will
take place, it is possible particularly if it can be proved that an individual
was denied due process in exercising his or her right to work by the
imposition of an unreasonable, arbitrary or irrational experience standard.
Regardless of whether the judiciary acts, however, and given the importance
of occupational freedom, experience requirements remain of primal importance for legislative determination.
The legislature currently has no method to determine whether or not an
existing or new experience requirement unreasonably burdens a prospective
individual in obtaining an occupational license. Until the legislature establishes a policy to rationally determine the appropriateness of such requirements, licensing laws cannot adequately serve the twin interests of freedom
to practice one's chosen occupation and protection of the consumer public.
Although the efficacy of prior experience for any of the occupations is a
question that needs further study, the present article sets forth useful
guidelines for analyzing the need for experience requirements, as new
licensing measures are proposed and as existing standards are reviewed by
the legislature. In the absence of such a systematic approach to determining
the need for experience requirements, the exercise of the state's police
power to regulate occupational entry may be without any rational basis and
violative of due process.
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